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The Possibihfty of
Reverter in Colorado
By CHARLES MELVIN NEFF*
(Continued from May Issue)
There was a strong dissenting opinion filed in this case by the Chief
Justice, Mr. Marshall. A splendid review of the case by Louis H. Rubin
may be found in 9 Boston University Law Review, p. 29 1.
It will be noted in this Ohio case that the court decided there was
no possibility of reverter and that the title to the lot, and buildings
thereon appurtenant thereto, remained in the grantees, the trustees of the
church, although the land was no longer used for church purposes. In
contrast to this case is another Ohio case-the Board of Education V.
Hollingsworth (1936), 56 Ohio Appellate Reports 95, in which the
habendum clause did contain the phrase "and no longer." In that case
the, same court decided that the title to the property upon the disuse of
the purposes for which it was granted became reinvested in the grantor.
It will also be noted in this latter case that the deed contained no provi-
sion for reversion nor did it preserve unto the grantor a right of re-entry.
The facts and decision of the Hollingsworth case are as follows:
Where the Habendum Clause Contains the Words "And No
Longer": In 1936, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in the case of Board of
Education v. Hollingsworth, 56 Ohio Appellate Reports 95, decided
that a deed conveying to a Board of Education a small lot of ground
and containing a clause, "To have and to hold * * * so long as the same
shall be occupied as a site for a schoolhouse and no longer," clearly ex-
presses an intention on the part of the grantor to provide for a reverter
and forfeiture and conveys a tenure limited to the continued use for
school purposes.
The facts were that the Board of Education filed an action to quiet
title to a small lot of ground which had for many years been used by it
for school purposes. Some four years previous to the filing of this action
such use had been discontinued, the Board of Education, by appropriate
resolution, found that the lot was no longer needed for such purposes
and thereupon the lot was ordered sold.
At the sale Hollingsworth bid for the premises, and the same were
sold to him. He paid $25.00 on the purchase price, but later took the
position that the Board of Education did not have any title to the prem-
ises in question which it could convey, and, therefore, that he was not
bound by his bid, but was, on the contrary, entitled to the refund of his
deposit. He filed an answer to this effect, and alleged therein that he had
acquired title from the heirs of one of the original grantors of the land
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and prayed that title to the premises be decreed in him. The lower court
sustained Hollingsworth and the Board of Education thereupon ap-
pealed. This Appellate Court took the position that the judgment of
the lower court in favor of Hollingsworth should be affirmed. The
Appellate Court held, in sustaining the lower court, that the deed con-
veyed not an absolute fee to the Board of Education, but merely a tenure
limited to the continued use for school purposes. The Appellate Court
in its opinion said:
"The question is considered in the cases of In Re Matter of
Copps Chapel M. E. Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N. E. 218;
Schwing v. McClure et al., Trustees, 120 Ohio St. 335, 166 N. E.
230; Licking County Agricultural Society v. County Commission-
ers, 48 Ohio App. 528, 194 N. E. 606; Schurch v. Harrirnan, 47
Ohio App. 383, 191 N. E. 907. See also: 13 Ohio Jurisprudence
961 ; 16 Ohio Jurisprudence 394, 396.
"In the Church case the court distinguishes lessee of Sperry
v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387, in which the language used was much the
same as that employed in the instant case, in that the following
expression appears in the deed: 'so long as they should continue
to use and improve the 'same for the express purpose of grinding,
and no longer.' In the Pond case the language used was held suffi-
cient to express the intention of reverter and forfeiture.
"In the Church case similar words, omitting the words 'no
longer,' were held not to express such intent. The question, as in
in wills, is what was the intention of the one who executed the
instrument, as such intention is gained from the words used?
While we agree with Judge Marshall in his dissenting opinion, that
the words 'no longer' add nothing to the strength of the words
used to express a reverter, we feel justified in adopting the same
line of demarcation used by the Supreme Court in distinguishing
the Pond case from the Church case, and in concluding that the
language used in the instant case clearly expressed an intention on
the part of the original grantor to provide for a reverter and for-
feiture.
'We are strengthened in our view of the law by the conclu-
sion of the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law
of Property. We quote from Tentative Draft No. 2, pages 21, 22:
"Section 54. Language sufficient to create an estate in deter-
minable fee simple.
"An estate in determinable fee simple is created by any limita-
tion which, in an otherwise effective conveyance of land:
"(a) Is effective to create an estate in fee simple, and
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"(b) Effectively provides that upon the happening of a
stated event the estate shall automatically terminate in
favor either of the conveyor or of his successor in in-
terest."
In the first of these two Ohio cases the clause was considered to be
merely declaratory of the purpose for which the land was conveyed, and
the recital was not held to have the effect of limiting the estate granted or
rendering it liable to divestiture upon departure from the use specified.
In the second Ohio case the habendum clause limited the purpose
and granted an estate for such time as it was so used and no longer. This
specified condition created a determinable or qualified fee, subject to term-
ination and reversion upon cessation of that use. It was the intention
and purpose implied that the title should revert to the grantor upon a
failure to use the land for a school.
In neither of the two above-mentioned Ohio cases did the deed of
conveyance contain a provision of reverter, or retain in behalf of the
grantor a right of re-entry. It was otherwise in the earliest Colorado
case, Cowell v. Colorado Springs (1876), 3 Colorado 82, affirmed, on
appeal, in 100 U. S. 50. There land was conveyed by a deed; granting
an estate in fee and containing the following condition:
"Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part, for and in
consideration of the sum of $250.00, to it in hand paid by the said
party of the second part, and also for the further consideration of
the agreements between the parties hereto, for themselves, their
heirs, successors, and legal representatives, that intoxicating liquors
shall never be manufactured, sold or otherwise disposed of as a
beverage in any place of public resort, in or upon the premises
hereby granted, or any part thereof; and it is herein and hereby
expressly reserved by the said party of the first part, that in case
any of the above conditions concerning intoxicating liquors are
broken by the said party of the second part, his assigns or legal
representatives, then this deed shall become null and void, and all
right, title and interest of, in, and to the premises hereby conveyed
shall revert to the said party of the first part, its successors and
assigns, and the said party of the second part by accepting this deed
for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, con-
sents and agrees to the reservations and conditions aforesaid."
Evidence was given tending to show that after the execution and
delivery of the deed, the grantee had sold and disposed of intoxicating
liquors as a beverage, in a place of public resort' upon the premises
granted.
The court held that the condition was valid, binding upon the
grantee and was not repugnant to the estate granted, and that, as the
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condition was broken, the grantor might at once maintain ejectment,
without previous entry, demand or notice.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1876, affirmed the judgment
in 110 U. S., p. 55, the court in its opinion, speaking through Mr.
Justice Field, saying:
"The principal questions, therefore, for our determination
are the validity of the condition, and, on its breach, the right of the
plaintiff to maintain the action without previous entry or demand
of possession.
"The validity of the condition is assailed by the defendant as
repugnant to the estate conveyed. His contention is, that as the
granting words of the deed purport to transfer the land, and the
entire interest of the company therein, he took the property in abso-
lute ownership, with liberty to use it in any lawful manner which
he might choose. With such use the condition is inconsistent, and
he therefore insists that it is repugnant to the estate granted. But
the answer is, that the owner of property has a right to dispose of
it with a limited restriction on its use, however much the restriction
may affect the value or the nature of the estate. Repugnant condi-
tions are those which tend to the utter subversion of the estate, such
as prohibit entirely the alienation or use of the property. Condi-
tions which prohibit its alienation to particular persons or for a
limited period, or its subjection to particular uses, are not subversive
of the estate: they do not destroy or limit its alienable or inheritable
character. Sheppard's Touchstone 129, 131. The reports are full
of cases where conditions imposing restrictions upon the uses to
which property conveyed in fee may be subjected have been upheld.
In this way slaughter-houses, soap factories, distilleries, livery sta-
bles, tanneries, and machine shops have, in a multitude of instances,
been excluded from particular localities, which, thus freed from
unpleasant sights, noxious vapors, or disturbing noises, have be-
come desirable as places for residences of families. To hold that
conditions for their exclusion from premises conveyed are inopera-
tive, would defeat numerous arrangements in our large cities for the
health and comfort of whole neighborhoods.
"The condition in the deed of the plaintiff against the manu-
facture or the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage at any place
of public resort on the premises, was not subversive of the estate
conveyed. It left the estate alienable and inheritable, and free to
be subjected to other uses. 'It was not unlawful nor against public
policy, but, on the contrary, it was imposed in the interest of public
health and morality.
"A condition in a deed, not materially different from that
under consideration here, was held valid and not repugnant to the
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grant by the Court of Appeals of New York in Plumb v. Tubbs,
41 N. Y. 442. And a similar condition was held by the Supreme
Court of Kansas to be a valid condition subsequent, upon the con-
tinued observance of which the estate conveyed depended. 14 Kan.
61. See also Doe v. Keeling, 1 Mau. & Sel. 95, and Gray v. Blan-
chard, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 283.
"We have no doubt that the condition in the deed to the de-
fendant here is valid and not repugnant to the estate conveyed. It
is a condition subsequent, and upon its breach the company had
a right to treat the estate as having reverted to it, and bring eject-
ment for the premises. A previous entry upon the premises, or a
demand for their possession, was not necessary. By statute in
Colorado it is sufficient for the plaintiff in ejectment to show a right
to the possession of the demanded premises at the commencement
of the action as heir, devisee, purchaser, or otherwise. The com-
mencement of the action there stands in lieu of entry and demand
of possession. See also Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish, 21 Pick.
(Mass.) 215; Cornelius v. Ivins, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 376; Ruch v.
Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693."
It will be noted that in the first Ohio case, the Copps Chapel case,
the court adjudged the title to be vested completely in the grantee, and
that no right at all remained in the grantor, not even a possibility of
reverter in case of condition broken. Without doubt a prospective pur-
chaser of the church lot could have obtained from the trustees a market-
able title in fee simple absorute.
But, in cases like the second Ohio case-the Board of Education-
and the Colorado case of Cowell, Colorado Springs, upon condition the
broken title, immediately leaves the grantee and reinvests in the grantor.
Nothing need be done by the grantor. The grantee has no title to sell.
The grantor has a marketable title in fee simple absolute to sell, and if
he is denied possession he may, as stated in the Colorado case, "at once
maintain ejectment, without previous entry, demand or notice." and we
may note here, as stated above, section 54, subsection (b) , of the Re-
statement of the Law of Property that "upon the happening of a stated
event the estate shall automatically (italics supplied) , terminate in favor
of the conveyor or of his successor in interest."
Other Colorado cases on this subject are B. and Colorado R. R. Co,
v. ColoradoE. R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154; and Board
of Commissioners of El Paso County, et al. v. City of Colorado Springs
(1919), 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301; D. & S. Fe Ry. Co. v. School
District (1890), 14 Colo. 327, 23 Pac. 978.
The right of possibility of reuerter contrasted with the right of
re-entry: There is a practical and a material difference between that
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state of the title where the grantor has only a mere possibility of reverter,
and where, on the other hand, he holds a right of entry for condition
broken. Attorney General u. Merrimack Mfg. Co. (1860), 14 Gray
586, 80 Mass. 586. Some courts seem to lose sight of the distinction
between the right to re-enter founded upon a condition subsequent, and
the right of possibility of reverter which, as stated in Burlington & C.
R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154,
is founded upon a limitation.
Thus the court in the case of Sioux City & St. Paul R. Co. v. Singer
(1892), Minn., 15 L. R. A. 751, at 753, declares that where there is a
conveyance of an estate in fee with the express condition that intoxicating
liquor should not be sold and the conveyance is recorded, then the suc-
cessive purchasers bought with constructive notice of it. And the court
allowed an action of ejectment. ''If," said the court, "by reason of the
breach of the condition subsequent, the plaintiff had a right to re-enter,
it was not necessary that the common law ceremony of a re-entry be per-
formed, as a condition precedent to the prosecution of an action to re-
cover the possession of the property," citing among other cases, Ruch V.
Rock Island (1878), 97 U. S. 693.
It will be noticed that the court, loose in its language, used the
words "condition subsequent," when it really considered the prohibition
against liquor selling as a limitation, and allowed ejectment, and not a
condition subsequent, which would necessitate action of re-entry. In
this connection the most exact language, expressing the distinction be-
tween the condition subsequent and the conditional limitation, used by
Mr. Justice Bigelow in Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square V.
Grant and Others, supra, may be noticed. This distinction is also em-
phasized and applied in the Colorado case of B. & Colorado R. R. Co.
v. ColoradoE. R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, supra, 88 Pac. 154.
Mr. Justice Bigelow on this distinction said in part (pp. 146-149)
"Strictly speaking, and using words in their precise legal im-
port, the devise in question does not create simply an estate on con-
dition. By the common law, a condition annexed to real estate
could be reserved only to the grantor or devisor, -and his heirs.
Upon a breach of the condition, the estate of the grantee or devisee
was not ipso facto terminated, but the law permitted it to continue
beyond the time when the contingency upon which it was given or
granted happened, and until an entry or claim was made by the
grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the devisor, who alone had the
right to take advantage of a breach. 21 Bl. Com. 156. 4 Kent
Com. (6th ed.) 122, 127. Hence arose the distinction between a
condition and a conditional limitation. A condition, followed by
a limitation over to a third person in case the condition be not ful-
filled, or there be a breach of it, is termed a conditional limitation.
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A condition determines an estate after breach upon entry or claim
by the grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of the devisor. A limitation
marks the period which determines the estate, without any act on
the part of him who has the next expectant interest. Upon the
happening of the prescribed contingency, the estate first limited
comes at once to an end, and the subsequent estate arises. If it
.were otherwise, it would be in the power of the heir to defeat the
limitation over, by neglecting or refusing to enter for breach of the
condition. This distinction was originally introduced, in the case
of wills, to get rid of the embarrassment arising from the rule of
the ancient common law, that an estate could not be limited to a
stranger, upon an event which went to abridge or destroy an estate
previously limited. A conditional limitation is therefore of a mixed
nature, partaking both of a condition and of a limitation; of a
condition, because it defeats the estate previously limited; and of a
limitation, because, upon the happening of the contingency, the
estate passes to the person having the next expectant interest, with-
out entry or claim.
"There is a further distinction in the nature of estates on
condition, and those created by conditional limitation, which it
may be material to notice. Where an estate in fee is created on con-
dition, the enter interest does not pass out of the grantor by the
same instrument or conveyance. All that remains, after the gift
or-grant takes effect, continues in the grafitor, and goes to his heirs.
This is the right of entry, as we have already seen, which, from the
nature of the grant, is reserved to the grantor and his heirs only,
and which gives them the right to enter as of their old estate, upon
the breach of the condition. This possibility of reverter, as it is
termed, arises in the grantor or devisor immediately on the creation
of the conditional estate. It is otherwise where the estate in fee is
limited over to a third persori in case of a breach of the condition.
Then the entire estate, by the same instrument, passes out of the
grantor or devisor. The first estate vests immediately, but the
expectant interest does not take effect until the happening of the
contingency upon which it was limited to arise. But both owe
their existence to the same grant or gift; they are created uno flatu;
and being an ultimate disposition of the entire fee, as well after as
before the breach of the condition, there is nothing left in the
grantor or devisor or his heirs. The right or possibility of reverter,
which, on the creation of an estate in fee on condition merely,
would remain in him, is given over by the limitation which is to
take effect on the breach of the condition.
"One material difference therefore, between an estate in fee on
condition and one on a conditional limitation, is briefly this: that
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the former leaves in the grantor a vested right, which, by its very
nature, is reserved to him, as a present existing interest, transmis-
sible to his heirs; while the latter passes the whole interest of the
grantor at once, and creates an estate to arise and vest in a third
person, upon a contingency, at a future and uncertain period of
time. A grant of a fee on condition only creates an estate of a base
or determinable nature in the grantee, leaving the right or possi-
bility of reverter vested in the grantor. Such an interest or right
in the grantor, as it does not arise and take effect upon a future
uncertain or remote contingency, is not liable to the objection of
violating the rule against perpetuities, in the same degree with other
conditional and contingent interests in real estate of an executory
character. The possibility of reverter, being a vested interest in
real property, is capable at all times of being released to the person
holding the estate on condition, or his grantee, and, if so .released,
vests an absolute and indefeasible 'title thereto. The grant or devise
of a fee on condition does not therefore fetter and tie up estates, so
as to prevent their alienation, and thus contravene the policy of the
law which aims to secure the free and unembarrassed disposition of
real property. It is otherwise with gifts or grants of estates in fee,
with limitations over upon a condition or event of an uncertain or
indeterminate nature. The limitation over being executory, and
depending on a condition, or an event which may never happen,
passes no vested interest or estate. It is impossible to ascertain in
whom the ultimate right to the estate may vest, or whether it will
ever vest at all, and therefore no conveyance or mode of alienation
can pass an absolute title, because it is wholly uncertain in whom
the estate will vest on the happening in the event or breach of the
condition upon which the ulterior gift is to take effect."
In the latter case the court further said: "The distinction between
an estate upon condition and the limitation by which an estate is deter-
mined upon the happening of some event, that in the latter case the
estate reverts to the grantor, or passes to the person to whom it is granted
by limitation over, upon the mere happening of the event upon which it
is limited, without entry or other act; while in the former the reservation
can only be made to the grantor or his heirs, and an entry upon breach
of the condition is requisite to revest the estate. The provision for re-
entry is therefore the distinctive characteristic of an estate upon condi-
tional and when it is found that by any form of expression the grantor
has reserved the right upon the happening of any event, to re-enter, and
thereby revest in himself his former estate, it may be construed as such.
Shep. Touch. 121, 122, Lit. Secs. 329, 330, 4 Cruise Dig. Title 32, c.
25, 4 Kent Com. (6th Ed.) 125, 126. The words 'provided,' 'so that,'
and 'upon condition that' are the usual words to make a condition; but
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to say that if a certain event happen the grantor may re-enter is equally
effectual. And the reason of this rule of construction is, that the stipu-
lation for a right of re-entry would be senseless if the deed were to be
construed to create a limitation; because the estate vesting upon the mere
happening of the event, the right to enter would of course follow with
all other rights of ownership." (Continued in July Issue)
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